Are AC72s “Too Big, Too Fast, Too Light”? A Practical Look at Safety and Design
Questions have been raised about whether the America’s Cup AC72 catamarans have reached a point where they are “too big, too fast, too light” to be safe. From my perspective, the answer is no — not in any categorical way. Context matters: compared with many earlier America’s Cup entries, the AC72 is fairly modest in size. Only the classic 12 Metre class was smaller; most Cup boats over the long history of the event have been much larger.
Are these boats unusually fast? Relative to previous Cup classes, AC72s are certainly among the quicker designs, comparable in speed to AC33-era boats. But speed alone does not equate to unsafe design. Are they too light? Again, that depends on the intended use. These boats are essentially prototype racecraft — pushing new aerodynamic and structural boundaries — and, so far, they have largely held together during sail testing. Failures have been limited in number, which, given the relatively short cumulative sailing time, is not an alarming record.
We do not yet have sufficient competitive racing data to issue a definitive safety verdict. Most of the sailing we’ve seen has been trials and practice sessions. Informal pairings have not produced major incidents. The two capsizes that have attracted most attention occurred during training runs, each at a time when the teams were already withdrawing for the day and heading ashore. That context is important when assessing risk.
Rather than asking whether AC72s are inherently unsafe, a more useful question is whether the class in its current specification is appropriate for racing on San Francisco Bay during peak months such as July, August and September, when regular afternoon sea breezes can exceed 30 knots. Originally, the class rules allowed two wing sizes; had the smaller wing been fitted by teams competing on breezier race days, the boats might have been easier to handle. Availability of a scaled-down wing could mitigate exposure to extreme conditions.
There is, however, clear evidence that experienced teams can handle these boats safely. Emirates Team New Zealand and Luna Rossa, sailing in New Zealand’s challenging summer conditions, demonstrated reliable and prolonged operation in stronger winds and rough seas without major structural failures. Emirates Team New Zealand, in particular, used every available day for sailing within the program’s rules, showing that long, consistent training is possible with these platforms. What remains to be seen is whether those levels of reliability and safety can be maintained under the intensified demands of high-stakes match racing.
From the start of this America’s Cup cycle, teams have understood that durability and reliability matter as much as top speed. Success in the Louis Vuitton Challenger Series and ultimately in defending or winning the America’s Cup requires boats that can endure repeated hard use. Challengers have been mindful of the fact that their race calendar often pushes them into windier months than the defender, Oracle Team USA, who faces a somewhat different seasonal window. With San Francisco as the venue and the AC72 as the chosen platform, teams have placed a strong emphasis on safe design, rigorous procedures, and established protocols for onshore operations, on-boat emergency handling, and support via tenders and spectator vessels.
Sailing always carries risks. Over many years, people have been injured and, sadly, sometimes lost their lives in a wide range of watercraft incidents — from small lakes to open oceans. The realities of those risks require constant vigilance and best-practice safety management. While such tragedies must be acknowledged and learned from, it’s also important to view single incidents within the broader context of the sport and the particular challenges of prototype racing yachts.
Is the America’s Cup being steered toward a NASCAR-style spectacle of breakneck speeds and lightweight behemoths — a vision sometimes associated with Larry Ellison’s approach? There is certainly a commercial and entertainment logic pushing the Cup in that direction. Winning teams do, after all, write the rules for the next Cup (within the Deed of Gift and mutual agreement), so the current format reflects choices by recent winners. Whether that evolution is desirable is a subject of debate within the sailing community.
There’s a lot of nostalgic talk about “traditional” Cup formats featuring many challengers and national teams. Much of that rhetoric overlooks the reality that, historically, the Cup has frequently been a contest between wealthy patrons using professional crews, and the event is technically a competition between yacht clubs rather than nations. From that standpoint, the current cycle — with a small number of well-funded challengers and professional teams campaigning large foiling catamarans — is not as radical a departure as it may seem.
One explicit aim of the current cycle was to broaden access and public appeal, but so far making the Cup more affordable for challengers has proven difficult. Whether the spectacle of high-speed catamarans will attract a sustainable, broader audience remains uncertain. Dramatic footage of capsizes and damage will draw attention, but that kind of publicity raises ethical questions about whether spectacle should drive design and rules rather than sound sporting and safety priorities.
In my view, part of the push behind the new Cup format has been to seed a professional circuit of large racing catamarans — an ambition championed by figures such as Russell Coutts and Paul Cayard after the last Cup. In that sense, the America’s Cup has been used as a platform to promote a broader professional circuit. That strategy may produce short-term turbulence, but the Cup itself has historically proven resilient.
On a more personal note, I believe sailing as a sport is primarily about participation. There are efforts to make sailing more television-friendly, which can lead to compromises in event formats and even Olympic class selection. For many sailors, the true reward is being on the water — the experience of sailing is what most participants cherish, not merely watching from afar.
Brett Bakewell-White is director and design principal of Bakewell-White Yacht Design in Auckland, New Zealand, and served as lead designer and technical director for Team Korea’s White Tiger Challenge, the fourth challenger for this Louis Vuitton Challenge Cup. The White Tiger team ultimately withdrew after failing to raise sufficient funds.
See related article: Safety in question after capsize of Cup catamaran
July 2013 issue